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Protecting the patient's interest 
THOMAS E. STARZL 
Department of Surgery, School of Medicine, University of Pittsburgh, PittsburRh, Pennsylvania, USA 
The ethical questions surrounding transplantation have be-
come a cottage industry for some of the research "think tanks," 
where issues are considered in the rarified atmosphere of a 
retreat setting, Interestingly, written accounts of sick patients' 
rights after such deliberations are usually fuzzy. 
As a result, potential violations of patient rights exist, and the 
scientific and administrative matrix in which we function could 
inadvertently permit or even promote patient abuse, 
The landmark documents 
In 1965. a symposium on medical ethics was convened in 
London at the Ciba Foundation [IJ. It was clear that transplan-
tation procedures, which had been a curiosity only two or three 
years earlier, were going to be used widely, Twenty-five par-
ticipantswere invited, including seven from the United States: 
Willard E, Goodwin, David W, Louisell, Joseph E. Murray, 
Keith Reemtsma, George E. Schreiner, Thomas E, Starzl. and 
C, E. Wasmuth, 
The medical atrocities of World War II were still fresh in the 
collective mind, and three of the European participants (David 
Daube, Regius Professor of Law, Oxford; Herbert de 
Wardener, Nephrologist at Charing Cross Hospital; and Mi-
chael Woodruff, Professor of Surgery, Edinburgh) had experi-
enced abject violation of their human rights during years spent 
in concentration camps, 
Two documents that were part of the postwar reaction to the 
European and Asian atrocities were reprgduced in the appendix 
of the Ciba proceedings, One was the Nuremberg Code and the 
other was its successor, the Helsinki Declaration, In plain 
language, the Helsinki Declaration divided human experimen-
tation into two categories: advanced therapy that could be of 
direct and immediate benefit to the person who requests it or 
investigation that might benefit humankind, but which may not 
directly benefit the person undergoing the experimentation, 
The nature of surgery almost always limits its investigation to 
the therapeutic category. With one possible exception, I have 
not carried out invasive procedures, including biopsies, except 
in the direct best interest of the surgical patient, and I have been 
reluctant to have others perform time-consuming, exhausting, 
or potentially dangerous studies on my patients, no matter how 
interesting the results might be. 
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The donor-recipient axis 
The living-related donor 
The possible exception mentioned above stems from a poten-
tial conflict of interest between the donor and recipient. In the 
early 1960's, the most convenient and perhaps only organ 
donors for many patients were family members. An organ that 
saved the life of another person was removed from a healthy 
and well-motived human being, a process well within the 
framework of conventional Judeo-Christian ethics. The act was 
compared to leaping into a lake to save someone who is 
drowning. But, concerns about the conditions under which 
these donations take place haunt us to this day. 
The legal (and probably the moral) basis for living donations 
dates back to a 1954 Massachusetts court ruling that permitted 
an ide!1tical twin transplantation. 1.:.he legal opinion reflected the 
probability that identical twins were so close, ~motionallyK as 
well as in every other way, that the loss of a kidney by the 
donor would be less devastating in the holistic sense than would 
be the loss of an identical twin sibling. Similar reasoning in 
subsequent court cases has been upheld and extended to other 
renal donations, including parents to offspring and other con-
sanguineous combinations. 
This lofty concept notwithstanding, many examples of donor 
abuse within families can be found. If a prospective donor is 
deficient in some way, usually intellectually, the family power 
structure may focus on him or her, the perceived deficiency 
serves as the basis of onc' s expendability. I have seen refusal of 
donation lead to ostracism within a family, or alternatively, 
donation could be a reluctant sacrifice offered to someone for 
whom there was little or no alfection. 
The question of coercion is a particularly important one with 
volunteer donors who may not possess their full civil rights. In 
an early Boston experience, and on a number of occasions 
since, minor identical twin donors (as young as 6 years of age) 
have been used. Of course, such donors must answer to their 
parents and thus are captive. The same captive concept applies 
to volunteer convict donors, who might be induced by emolu-
ments, other favors, or, conceivably, threats to step forward. 
Although I was one of the first to use the expediency of living 
donation and have never had a donor die, the concept remains 
a troubling one to me. and I have not operated on a living donor 
since 1972. 
Nothing is foolproof in medicine, and the hope that kidney 
donation would be without mortality was a vain one. Some 15 
or 16 healthy volunteers have died after donor nephrectomy. 
Technical surgical accidents, pulmonary embolism, and ancs-
Published by Springer-Verlag. New York Inc. S-31 
-----------------------------------------------------------
S-32 Slarzi 
thesia-related hepatic failure have been the most common 
causes. It may be that survivors with a single kidney face an 
increased hazard in the long run, as several recent, controver-
sial reports have suggested. Questions abound that make the 
concerned ph ysician uneas y. 
The cadaveric donor 
Obtaining organs from people who are dead is the alternative. 
At the London meeting in \965, the concept of "brain death" 
was expressed for the first time. Kidneys were being removed 
from "bc3.ting heart" cadavers in Louvain, Belgium, and iso-
lated examples of this practice in other European countries 
were reported. At first, this idea appalled me because I envi-
sioned that the care of a trauma victim could be jeopardized by 
virtue of his or her candidacy to become an organ donor. 
These fears were unfounded. The chances of a seriously 
injured patient being properly cared for were actually greatly 
increased by defining death by brain function rather than by the 
conventional criteria of cessation of heart beat and respiration. 
Under the circumstances that existed before, when someone 
with a serious central nervous systcm injury was brought into 
the emergency room, the physician was often obliged to make 
an on-the-spot decision about the patient's capability of sur-
vival. A negative decision precluded resuscitation, since it was 
almost impossible to discontinue ventilatory support later with-
out being accused of murder. With the wide acceptance of brain 
death in the Western World, all such patients have a fair trial at 
resuscitation. Then, in an orderly way, it can be determined 
whether they are merely enduring heart-lung preparations, or if 
they have some prospect of having meaningful brain function 
restored. The quality of care and the discriminate application of 
such care to terribly damaged people has been one of the great 
fringe benefits of transplantation. 
The potential abuse of resources 
Regional franchises 
Until a decade ago, only aggressive or wealthy patients with 
end-stage renal disease could stay alive. Chronic dialysis and 
transplantation were both too expcnsive for most others. Fam-
ilies became bankrupt in desperate efforts to keep one of their 
members alive. 
The terrible quandary ended with the passage of the so-called 
HR-\ Bill of 1972. Since that time. competition has developed 
for the Federal End-Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) budget, which 
by 1982 had swollen to a $2 billion per year. An economic 
aristocracy was created for physicians and/or surgeons who 
controlled "regional concessions" for dialysis, vascular access 
surgery, and transplantation. The struggles that have ensued for 
various franchises within the ESRD Program, including 
cadaveric organ procurement agencies, sometimes have been 
mammoth. 
Captin' patient pOPlllations 
In large cities or regions wherc a transplantation monopoly 
has been established, the resultant captive population of pa-
tients often has been well served. However, a center with poor 
results may be difficult to dislodge from its monolithic position. 
in which case most transplantation candidates would have no 
options to seek other avenues of care. Furthermore, a dehu-
manizing element can be introduced unconsciously with a 
captive practice. For instance, recipients on a cadaveric waiting 
list may feel that they cannot be demanding, express hostility, 
or deviate in any way from model behavior for fear of jeopar-
dizing their candidacy. Personally, I believe that when a situa-
tion like this develops, the only alternative is to set up a 
competing transplantation team, since there are few things 
more degrading to patients than to be treated as a custodial 
case. 
A potentially stu/tifyinR effect of the ESRDP 
A large cash flow can contribute to the fixation of therapeutic 
practices at an unsatisfactory level since any major change is 
apt to affect the way that business is transacted to require 
inconvenient retraining and the acquisition of new knowledge. 
It has not been difficult to identify reactionary nephrologists and 
surgeons alike who became wealthy from the flow of Federal 
money, and whose riches then made them a powerful lobbying 
force against policy changes, in spite of their general Jack of 
insight into the process of scientific inquiry and their miniscule 
record of discovery and contribution. Their refuge has been 
blind adherence to, and even insistence upon, historically 
important but dangerous, morbid, and ineffective immunosup-
pressive techniques, or a persistent dependence upon living, 
related transplantation with its generally less formidable im-
mune barrier. 
Randomized trialomania 
I have heard it seriously proposed that bona fide candidates 
for liver or heart transplantation be randomized into those 
receiving therapy vs. controls. Few would object to describing 
such suggestions as randomized trialomania; however, 
trialomania can present with more subtle symptoms. 
Premature randomization 
An insistence upon carrying on randomized trials before 
learning the optimal use of new therapeutic tools may discredit 
promising developments. When the powerful new immunosup-
pressive agent, cyclosporine, was first used clinically, multiple, 
unanticipated management problems were encountered. More 
than 50 pilot cases were necessary before effective management 
schemes could be evolved, and these required combination 
therapy with steroids. There was no justification during this 
time for a randomized trial, yet, nearly continuous pressure to 
conduct such a trial came from several sources. 
Randomization after the fact 
Before the foregoing extensive pilot trials had been com-
pleted. it was obvious that cyclosporine-steroid therapy was 
superior to conventional double drug immunosuppression with 
azathioprine and prednisone, and that randomization against 
the latter double drug treatment would create an inequity. For 
a randomized clinical trial to be carried out ethically. it is 
necessary that the physician be convinced that he or she is 
dealing with the null hypothesis of no treatment differences. 
For many transplant surgeons using cyclosporine-steroid 
therapy, a null hypothesis no longer existed. In spite of this. the 
institutional review board insisted upon a randomized trial in 
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primary cadaveric kidney recipients and it was conducted in 
1981. The primary graft survival at the end of one year was 90% 
in the cyclosporine-steroid group, and 50% in the control group. 
The results were predictable, both from the preceding pilot trial 
and what had been learned about the potency and relative 
safety of cyclosporine from animal work. 
A randomized trial is not an instrument of discovery, but 
rather a means of validation. Schneider [2] has pointed out that 
the significance tests applied to randomized trials ordinarily are 
concerned primarily with preventing erroneous rejection of a 
null hypothesis; thus. they will reveal treatment differences at 
an error level of 5% only for very large deviations or with very 
large samples. Because of these limitations, Schneider re-
marked acidulously that "significance tests are more adapted to 
preventing progress than to achieving it." 
A revealing question that physicians might ask before assign-
ing patients to a randomization study would be whether they 
would allow therapy to be decided by lot for themselves or their 
family members if they suffered from the same disease. 
Summary 
Notwithstanding recent developments, protection of pa-
tients' rights and the identification of potential areas of patient 
abuse will continue to be a complex problem. 
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